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ABSTRACT In this paper, we describe the long-term evolution of societies of secondary users in dynamic
spectrum access networks. Such an understanding is important to help us anticipate future trends in the
organization of large-scale distributed networked deployments. Such deployments are expected to arise in
support of a wide variety of applications, including vehicular networks and the Internet of Things. Two new
biologically-inspired spectrum access strategies are presented here, and compared with a random access
baseline strategy. The proposed strategies embody a range of plausible assumptions concerning the sensing
capabilities and social characteristics of individual secondary users. Considering these strategies as the basis
of a game against the field, we use replicator dynamics within an evolutionary game-theoretic analysis to
derive insights into the physical conditions necessary for each of the strategies to be evolutionarily stable.
Somewhat surprisingly, we find that the physical channel conditions almost always uniquely determine
which one of the three (pure) strategies is selected, and that no mixed strategy ever survives. We show
that social tendencies naturally become advantageous for secondary users as they find themselves situated
in network environments with heterogeneous channel resources. Hardware test-bed experiments confirm the
validity of the analytic conclusions. Taken together, these results predict the emergence of social behavior
in the spectrum access etiquette of secondary users as cognitive radio technology continues to advance and
improve. The experimental results show an increase in the throughput of up to 90%, when strategy evolution
is continuously operational, compared with any static strategy. We present use cases to envision the potential
application of the proposed evolutionary framework in real-world scenarios.
INDEX TERMS
networking.

Dynamic spectrum access, cognitive radio, evolutionary game theory, bio-social

I. INTRODUCTION

Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) is a new paradigm in wireless networking, wherein radio spectrum frequencies may be
assigned dynamically to remediate spectrum scarcity. Opportunistic Spectrum Access is a prominent DSA model in which
any secondary user (SU) is allowed to use radio spectrum
already licensed to a primary userİ (PU), as long as the
PU is not subjected to interference. Opportunistic spectrum
access naturally gives rise to the concerns of spectrum sensing
(see [1], [2] and others), since its implementation requires
detecting the presence of primary users [3], or equivalently,
their absence, i.e. spectrum holes.
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Cognitive Radio (CR) is a framework of enabling technologies which facilitate the implementation of self-configured
DSA networks [4], providing for spectrum sensing, management, mobility, and sharing. Here we anticipate that
the sensing technologies originally developed to coordinate
PU-SU interactions [5], might be adapted and re-appropriated
within the CR paradigm, to enable more harmonious SU-SU
co-existence, thus ensuring more effective resource sharing.
Channel selection is an inherently complex task in multichannel CR networks, since each SU can (potentially) take
a wide range of variables into consideration in its channel
selection strategy, including: instantaneous Channel State
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See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
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Information (CSI), social environment, user preferences, and
history. The following question is the central focus of this
work:
As SU sensing capabilities advance to make more variables
accessible to the channel selection strategy, how can we
reasonably expect population-level behaviors of rationally
driven SUs to evolve, assuming that spectrum utilization is
the main objective of each user?
Towards resolving the question, we consider three successively more advanced spectrum users:
• Primitive users who are not capable of sensing channel
characteristics, or responding to them behaviorally.
• Foraging users who are capable of sensing channel
characteristics, and can respond behaviorally by either
consuming (transmitting) or foraging for (listening)
resources;
• Social users who are additionally capable of sensing the
identities of co-users within their environment, and can
respond by deferring to them (or not).
Through analysis and experimental studies, we describe
which of the three strategies (or mixture thereof) dominates
in any given environmental context. By arriving at a complete
quantitative description of the evolutionary equilibrium point
in SU spectrum access etiquette, we reveal the factors affecting the strategic decision-making of rational secondary users
with respect to opportunistic spectrum access. Knowing these
factors is a necessary prerequisite to ensuring that SU-SU
co-existence benefits from advances in spectrum sensing to
the maximum extent possible long-term.
We demonstrate that spectrum utilization can be enhanced
using the above bio-social behaviors within an evolutionary
framework. The experimental results indicates an increase in
the throughput of up to 90% when evolution is continuously
operational, compared to when any one strategy is statically
deployed.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Prior
work is discussed in Section II. Section III introduces the
behavioral models and the utility functions being maximized.
Section IV presents several use cases for the devised strategies. The results of formal analysis and experimental based
studies of system dynamics are presented in Sections V,
and VI, respectively. Finally, conclusions and future research
directions are discussed in Section VII.
II. PRIOR RELATED WORK

Most prior research in cognitive radio focuses primarily on
PU-SU dynamics (e.g. [5] and others), ignoring SU-SU interactions. Exceptions are the recent work of Dixit et al. [6]
and Xing and Chandramouli [7] as well as that of
Wisniewska et al. [8], [9]. Our work here also serves to
elucidate the nature of SU-SU dynamics and extends the
work of Shattal et al. [10]. Research into PU-SU and SU-SU
interactions can be classified in three broad categories:
(a) machine learning formulations, (b) biologically or socially
inspired schemes, and (c) game-theoretic approaches. The
results presented here serve to address the research gap
VOLUME 6, 2018

emanating from the aucity of studies that address the role
of SU interactions in support of enhanced DSA. This
research gap is illustrated in Figure 1 relative to the different
DSA/CR-related research areas addressed in the recent
literature.

FIGURE 1. Taxonomy of DSA problems and approaches.

Machine learning approaches have been applied extensively to spectrum sharing [11], spectrum sensing [12]
and channel selection [13]. Specifically, different types of
machine learning algorithms have been incorporated into
CR network protocols (see [14] for a survey), including
support vector machines [15], re-enforcement learning [16]
and Q-Learning [17]. Unfortunately, in machine learning
approaches it is difficult to provide the SU with the correct
action that is best for the current situation, especially for
DSA systems in dynamic environments. This problem can
be seen, for example, in reinforcement learning approaches
where decision making depends on a trial and error process
with evaluative feedback [18].
Biologically or socially inspired approaches typically
begin by incorporating a social component to users’ behavioral models (e.g., preferential bias [19], peer recommendations [20], and selfishness [21]). These approaches consider
the CR ecosystem as a social network [22], [23] for which
cooperative schemes are designed [24]. Such approaches
recognize the optimization inherent in evolving biological
systems, and seek to apply the outcomes of biological natural
selection processes to the realm of CR networks. Behavioral
models based on animal social interactions are by now well
recognized as the basis of a wide range of resource allocation problems, including MANET routing [25], Vehicular
Network (VANET) routing [26], and sensor network management [27]. In the context of CR, bio-socially inspired models have been developed for spectrum sensing [27], channel
selection [24], and efficient routing [25]. Genetic algorithms
have been used to tune CR parameters for better spectrum
usage [28], and recommendation systems have been applied
to minimize sensing and decision-making times required
for channel selection [29]. Unfortunately, idealized biosocial models based on animal societies (e.g., termites [30],
ants [31], etc.) require a level of coordination among population individuals [32]. The assumption of pre-agreed upon
13143
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FIGURE 2. Finite State Machine for the proposed bio-social users. (a) FSM for ACU. (b) FSM for FCU. (c) FSM for SFU.

coordination fails to take into consideration possible longterm evolution of strategies for users. Our approach, which
allows SU strategies to evolve, sidesteps this shortcoming.
Game theory approaches have been used as a mathematical framework for scenario-based analysis and modeling of
CR networks (see [33] and [34] for a survey of prior work in
this area). Competition among SUs over network resources
has been modeled as a non-cooperative game [35]. Unfortunately, most game-theoretic research relies on the availability
of spectrum statistics in order to formulate the game and cope
with spectrum dynamic changes, especially in stochastic [36]
and repeated games [37]. Such information is not known
a priori, limiting the applicability of this approach [38].
Evolutionary game theory (EGT) has captured the attention
of researchers in DSA because of its impressive ability to
model potential PU-SU dynamics as an evolving game [39].
In some cases, evolutionary stable strategies have been
found to exhibit in-simulation performance improvements of
almost 35% [12]. EGT is also attractive because it relaxes
the traditional rationality assumptions of game theory [40],
which require all players to have complete knowledge of
the game. Yet another advantage of EGT is that its framework of replicator dynamics can provide computable rates
of convergence to an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS),
and thus generate concrete predictions of the distribution of
the deployed strategies and a picture of the adaptation of
users over time. Despite the fact that uncoordinatedİ access
to the spectrum by SUs would likely result in poor long-term
spectrum utilization, SU interactions have not been studied
thoroughly in the literature. One exception, however, is the
work of Jiang et al. [2] which studied the SUs’ spectrum
access jointly with spectrum sensing based on EGT.
In this work, we apply EGT to the DSA/CR domain to
shed light on what we can reasonably expect to witness as
SU etiquette in the long-term. We focus on the emergence of
bio-socially inspired foraging and socializing behaviors, and
the potential impacts of these behaviors on the overall performance of the system as measured by spectrum utilization.
III. BEHAVIORAL MODELS

In what follows, we assume a community of N SUs. Each
SU seeks to transmit data at a rate of R bits/s. SUs operate
13144

within an ecosystem of M spectrum channels. Each channel i
(i = 1..M ) has capacity Ci bit/s, and a fraction αi ∈ [0, 1]
of the overall channel capacity that is available for SU communications. When αi = 0, SUs are not permitted to transmit (i.e., a PU is present); when αi = 1, all SUs who are
tuned to channel i may transmit at rate R (e.g., because the
PU is absent). While Ci depends on the channel conditions
including noise and interference, αi only depends on the
presence of the PU, and defined as follows:
(
0; RPUi > 0
αi =
1; RPUi = 0
where RPUi is the PU transmission rate on the channel i.
In this work, we will vary (i) the range of channel selection strategies used by the SU population, and (ii) the channel characteristics, towards quantifying the impact of these
two factors on (iii) actual throughput attained by the SUs.
Attained throughput will define the system’s utility, and its
maximization will act as the fitness function driving evolutionary pressure on SU etiquette.
We introduce three different channel selection strategies,
namely: Always Consume User (ACU), Forage-Consume
User (FCU), Social Forage-Consume User (SFU).
The Always-Consume User (ACU) is always transmitting
on some channel that is selected uniformly at random, following the Finite State Machine (FSM) in Figure 2-(a). This
simple strategy (used previously in [41]) allows the ACU to
act with a naïve view to capture utility using the set of channel
resources. The ACUs strategy has the advantage that it can be
implemented cheaply since no sensing capability is needed.
The channel selection process itself is fast, requiring minimal computational resources and no coordination overhead.
In practice, an ACU may access congested channels instead
of using channels that have higher residual capacity. The
performance of ACUs serves as a baseline for the incremental
benefits of more sophisticated foraging and social behaviors.
Advancing from the ACU, the Forage-Consume
User (FCU) has the ability to engage in two distinct activities. It may either sense the CSI (‘‘forage’’) but abstain
from transmission, or it may transmit data on a channel (‘‘consume’’). The FCU’s choice to consume may, in turn,
be based on information about the CSI sensed while foraging.
VOLUME 6, 2018
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Interference level, noise level, and capacity are examples of
potential CSI.1 The FCU forgoes short-term utility benefits
while in the foraging state, but may stand to gain more longterm utility by acquiring information about the channels.
On the other hand, too much foraging could yield inefficient usage of spectrum resources and decreased utility.
As depicted in Figure 2-(b), an FCU is in one of two states.
The FCU is in the consume state with asymptotic relative
frequency Pc . In this state, it transmits data and switches
between channels with stochastic bias proportional to its
estimates of the channels relative capacities. The FCU is in
forage state with asymptotic relative frequency 1 − Pc . In this
state, it only collects CSI as it switches across all channels.
Based on the CSI, each FCU establishes preferential access
to specific channels.
In this work, FCUs consider the relative capacity of channel i as the CSI of interest:
X
Ci = αi Ci /
αj Cj
(1)
j

where j = 1, 2, . . . , M . While foraging, FCUs bias their
stochastic selection of each channel proportionally to the
channel’s relative capacity. This behavior encourages FCUs
to utilize channels with higher relative capacities.
Unfortunately, SUs cannot measure Ci directly (especially
in the dynamic presence of PUs). To circumvent this obstacle,
here we allowed SUs to estimate the relative capacity of the
channel via the throughput recently attained within it. The
throughput Rth can be drawn from the Shannon’s formula:
Rth = B · (1 + Pk

Gz Pz

y=1 Gzy Py

+W

)

where k is the number of co-consumers (i.e., interferers)
in the channel i, the transmission power of SU z (resp.
y) are denoted Pz (resp. Py ); B is the channel bandwidth;
Gz is the channel gain for transmissions by z, Gzy represents
the channel gain for the transmission between z and y, and
W is the power level of the ambient white Gaussian noise.
Each FCU considers its recently attained fractional throughput γ (αi Ci , ni , Pc R) reflected from Rth as a ‘‘learned’’ proxy
estimate for the capacity of its current transmission channel.
Thus, if ni SUs (1 ≤ ni ≤ N ) are co-consuming channel i,
the FCUs estimate the relative channel capacity Ci as follows:
γ (αi Ci , ni , Pc R)
Ci ≈ P
j γ (αj Cj , nj , Pc R)

(2)

where j = 1, 2, . . . , M . This estimate reflects the actual
relative capacity of the channels. It is also responsive to the
presence of PUs. For example, if the users have access to
4 channels each with 1Mbps available capacity and
1 In this work, we do not focus on contributions toward the problem of
spectrum sensing, but rather assume that an FCU has access to sufficientİ
information about the channel at the moment of decision-making. In our
analysis, simulation and hardware experiments (described in later sections),
the FCU has access to basic CSI on noise and interference levels), implemented as channel sniffing spectrum sensing at the MAC layer.
VOLUME 6, 2018

a PU arrives in channel 1, then α1 drops from 1 to 0, and
the updated estimate (2) reflects the presence of a PU. The
low (proxy measure of) CSI now ensures that FCUs will not
switch to channel 1. When the FCU forages, it receives no
utility, and when it consumes, it consumes channel i with
probability Ci .
Advancing from FCU, the Social Forage-Consume
User (SFU) incorporates sociality as an additional factor
in its channel selection logic. Sociality presumes enhanced
sensing capabilities beyond the mere measurement of relative
capacity levels, as it requires SUs to sense some aspect of the
identities of co-users in the channels. SFUs may choose not to
transmit on a channel because of the presence of other users
with whom a social relationship exists.
In this work, we consider a particular type of social relationship among the SFUs. We refer to this phenomenon as
deference. Specifically, we consider the situation in which
whenever a SFU decides to begin transmitting on a channel, the other SFUs who are also presently transmitting on
the channel tend to defer by exhibiting a bias towards not
transmitting. The SFU behavioral model reflects well-known
findings from the structure of animal [42] and non-human
primate [43] societies. In these societies, sociality plays a
significant organizing function and helps ensure species survival. In our work, the social deference behavior witnessed in
animal societies is leveraged to yield benefits for secondary
users in terms of reduced conflict over resources.
As depicted in Figure 2-(c), a SFU operates using the same
FSM as the FCU but with the consume state split into Active
and Defer substates. While in the consume state, the SFU is
in the Defer substate with asymptotic relative frequency Ps .
In this ‘‘social’’ state, the SU does not transmit or switch
channels, deferring for the benefit of other SFUs in the
DSA society. A stochastic process governed by Ps allows
SFUs in Defer state to switch to Active state. While in the
Active substate with asymptotic relative frequency 1 − Ps ,
the SFU transmits data at an elevated rate (1 + S+ )R. This
increase helps in using the additional bandwidth that has
been relinquished by deferrers. S+ ∈ [0, 1] is the percentage
that represents this increase in the rate. Each SFU continues
switching between channels with stochastic bias proportional
to its estimates of the channels’ relative capacities.
To account for the costs of coordination among the SFUs
consuming a channel, we will assume that each gives up
S− fraction of its utility towards coordination overhead.
S− ∝ c0 N h : h ∈ [1, 2] represents the social penalty due
to coordination overhead among SFUs to access the channel. S− increases proportionally with the number of SFUs
(i.e., N ). h is an exponent that represents the degree to which
SFUs coordinate their social attributes. For full coordination among social users h = 2 (i.e., NxN coordination
among SFUs). S− is protocol-specific coordination overhead with some constant c0 . The S− factor encompasses
the effect of the sociality coordination overhead. The exact
coordination overhead is scenario specific (network architecture, network protocol and standard, and channel assignment
13145
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scheme). This factor is impacted by the nature of the coordination and cooperation among SFUs. For example, if the
interaction comprises of a prioritized access among the SFUs,
the overhead will be different than for schemes where all
SFUs have the same priority to access the channels.
In the next sub-sections, we discuss the utility of SUs
utilizing the proposed strategies in two different systems,
namely: homogeneous and heterogeneous. In homogeneous
systems, all SUs utilize the same strategy. In heterogeneous
systems, different SUs utilize different strategies. In both
cases, the utility is presented for single and multi-channel
systems. These utilities will be the basis for our analysis (Section V) and experimental studies (Section VI).
A. UTILITY OF THE SUs IN HOMOGENEOUS SYSTEMS

Z = (C, N , R)
The fractional throughput of the SUs in Z is written as:

(3)

(4)

OiFCU = Ci · N

(5)

OiSFU = Ci · (1 − PS ) · N

(6)

The total demand for channel i is computable as
Di (Z , s) =

Ois

·R

(7)

and the fractional throughput of users in channel i is:
Xηi (Z ∗ , s) = η(αi Ci , Ois , R)
13146

M
1 X
R · Xηi (Z ∗ , s)
M

(10)

i=1

∗

Us=FCU (Z ) = Pc

M
X

Ci · R · Xηi (Z ∗ , s)

(11)

i=1

In a homogeneous environment consisting of N SFUs,
the expected utility of each SFU is thus:
M
X

Ci (1 + S+ ) · R · (1 − S− ) · Xηi (Z ∗ , s)
(12)

having access to M > 1 channels of capacities C1 , . . . CM .
Assuming Z ∗ is in steady state, Ois represents the expected
number of SUs employing strategy s on channel i. Therefore,
the occupancy of the SUs employing the ACU, FCU, and SFU
strategies on channel i can be represented as follows:

∗

Us=ACU (Z ∗ ) =

i=1

Where η(αC, N , R) denotes the expected instantaneous
fractional throughput (between 0 and 1) obtained by each
SU in a homogeneous system when N SUs are simultaneously transmitting at rate R on the same channel having α
of the overall capacity C available for SU communications.
In practice, this function is dependent on the particular link
layer technology and protocols used. The function η plays an
important role in quantifying the performance of the model
that follows.
Now, when we consider a system Z ∗

N
M

Here ρ is a fitting parameter chosen so that η mirrors
experimental measurements. In a homogeneous environment
consisting of N ACUs, the expected utility of each ACU is
given by:

Us=SFU (Z ∗ ) = Pc

Xη (Z) := η(αC, N , R)

OiACU =

(9)

In a homogeneous environment consisting of N FCUs,
the expected utility of each FCU is thus:

Consider a homogeneous system S in which there are N SUs
of ACUs, FCUs, or SFUs, acting on one channel of capacity C
and the SUs transmit at a rate of R. Such a system is specified
by a 3-tuple

Z ∗ = (C, N , R)

While the precise form of η is intractable, we will take

1
if Di (Z ∗ , s) < ρCi
i
∗
1
Xη (Z , s) ≈

if Di (Z ∗ , s) ≥ ρCi
∗
expDi (Z ,s)−ρCi

(8)

B. UTILITY OF THE SUs IN HETEROGENEOUS SYSTEMS

In heterogeneous systems, each SU chooses one strategy to
employ, although different SUs may make different choices.
Consider a heterogeneous system S in which there are
k1 ACUs, k2 FCUs, ad k3 SFUs. In S, there is just one channel
of capacity C and the ACUs and the FCUs transmit at a rate
of r1 while SFUs transmit at a rate of r2 . Such a system is
specified by a 5-tuple
S = (k1 , k2 , k3 , r1 , r2 )

(13)

The fractional throughput of the SUs in S is written as:
Xγ (S) := γ (αC, k1 + k2 , r1 , k3 , r2 )

(14)

Considering a multi-channel system S ∗ , we have:
S ∗ = (k1 , k2 , k3 , r1 , r2 )

(15)

having access to M > 1 channels of capacities C1 , . . . CM .
In what follows, S ∗ will always consist of a set of SUs who
each follow a pure strategy. We will, however, sometimes
subject the system to the possibility that some fraction of its
players could ‘‘mutate’’ to different (possibly mixed) strategy.
Assuming S ∗ is in steady state, the expected number of
ACUs, FCUs and SFUs in channel i is given by
OiACU =

NACU
M

(16)

OiFCU = Ci NFCU

(17)

OiSFU = Ci (1 − PS )NSFU

(18)
VOLUME 6, 2018
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The total demand for channel i is computable as
∗

Di (S ) =

(OiACU

+ OiFCU )·R + OiSFU

· (1 + S+ )·R

(19)

and the fractional throughput of users in channel i is:
Xγi (S ∗ ) = γ (αi Ci , OiACU + OiFCU , R, OiSFU , (1 + S+ ) · R)
(20)
While the precise form of γ is intractable (as in the γ in the
homogeneous system), we will take

1
if Di (S ∗ ) < ρCi
i
∗
1
Xγ (S ) ≈
(21)

if Di (S ∗ ) ≥ ρCi
∗
expDi (S )−ρCi
Here ρ is a fitting parameter chosen so that γ mirrors experimental measurements. In system (S ∗ ), the utility achieved by
each ACU, FCU, and SFU, respectively is:
UACU (S ∗ ) =

M
1 X
R · Xγi (S ∗ )
M

(22)

i=1

UFCU (S ∗ ) = Pc

M
X

Ci · R · Xγi (S ∗ )

(23)

Ci · R · Gs · Xγi (S ∗ )

(24)

i=1

USFU (S ∗ ) = Pc

M
X
i=1

where Gs = (1 + S+ ) · (1 − S− ) is the sociality gain.
The system utility is expressed as:
US (S ∗ ) = NACU · UACU (S ∗ )
+ NFCU · UFCU (S ∗ ) + NSFU · USFU (S ∗ )

(25)

When an individual user gains more utility due to channel
switching or strategy evolution, the system’s utility US (S ∗ )
increases accordingly. The system utility is a measure of
how SUs are acting on the system and provide us with a
basis of judgment for the long term benefits of strategies
in the system. Formal performance analysis is provided in
section V, in which limits and conditions for each SU strategy
to maximize the system utility are established.

delayed or dropped packets affect the availability of the
data for medical staff. This issue is particularly important
in unlicensed bands where spectrum is also simultaneously
accessed by other networks (e.g., WiFi, Bluetooth, etc.) that
are outside the control of the EHS system. Leveraging foraging behaviors and social interactions between secondary
users (EHS sensors) can potentially yield throughput gains
for the overall EHS system. In short, DSA approaches can
provide a flexible self-configuring solution for devices to
utilize in multichannel unlicensed bands.
Considering the proposed DSA strategies, we anticipate the following three cases, for potential benefits for
EHS applications:
Case 1 - Potential benefits from ACU strategies: This strategy potentially provides better performance when the traffic
demand from EHS sensors is low. It represents a primitive
candidate strategy for channels with lower contention levels.
However, this strategy fails to benefit from channels with
better conditions, in the cases where channels have different
contention levels. The implementation of this strategy is cost
effective since it does not require sensing, and requires minimal computation resources to randomize the channel access.
Case 2 - Potential benefits from FCU strategies: In this
strategy, sensors transmit traffic intelligently on channels
that have fewer co-users by actively sensing the channels
characteristics. An effective implementation of this strategy’s
must specify an appropriate balance between the time used
for sensing and the time used for transmission. This strategy
needs more computation and network resources to implement
the decision making and channel sensing processes compared
to the ACU strategy.
Case 3 - Potential benefits from SFU strategies: SFUs
have potential advantage when devices are able to socialize within groups in a hierarchical or prioritized manner.
Sensors could be potentially classified into groups based on
their traffic demand. Sensitive data might be transmitted with
higher priority and SFUs might form deference hierarchies
to coordinate and prioritize their transmissions. An effective
use of this strategy’s must address the trade-off between the
overhead of social coordination, channel sensing, and the gain
from the social deference.

IV. USE CASES AND APPLICATIONS

In this section, two real-world scenarios are introduced to
address the applicability of the proposed strategies.
A. INTERNET-OF-THINGS: ELECTRONIC HEALTH SERVICES

Electronic Health Services (EHS) is an application in the
Internet-of-Things (IoT) domain, in which vital data is transmitted and processed to advance human health. In this application, wireless sensors are connected to the patients to sense
and transmit vital data (i.e., heart rate, blood pressure, etc.).
These sensors transmit data to the nursing stations to be
monitored and reviewed for fast recommendations and quick
response.
In cases where the number of the patients is large,
spectrum access becomes a critical aspect of system since
VOLUME 6, 2018

B. INFOTAINMENT TRAFFIC THROUGHPUT:
INTERNET OF VEHICLES

Our approach can be potentially applied to VANETs, where
vehicles communicate over channels that are rapidly changing in terms of the number of SUs. The load is completely generated by SUs (vehicles) since VANETs utilize Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) service and control channels, and (unlike in the EHS setting)
do not coexist with other networks. In this application,
we optimize the throughput of infotainment traffic. The interplay between infotainment and safety traffic in VANETs
ensures that optimizing the throughput of infotainment traffic will yield greater (residual) bandwidth to support safety
traffic.
13147
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Considering the proposed DSA strategies, we can anticipate the following three cases:
Case 1 - Potential benefits from the ACU strategy: If the
infotainment traffic is evenly distributed across the service
channels, the ACU strategy provides fast channel access with
minimal decision making overhead. The cost of implementing this strategy is low, similar to the cost of its deployment
in the EHS use case.
Case 2 - Potential benefits from the FCU strategy: Applying the FCU strategy helps the SUs to access the service
channels that have less contention on average to enhance the
overall throughout of the system. The cost of implementing
this strategy is similar to the cost of the FCU strategy discussed in Case 2 of the EHS use case.
Case 3 - Potential benefits from the SFU strategy: Applying
the grouping and socializing primitives of the SFU strategy,
we can provide different groups of users with prioritized
access to the channels. This is especially important in cases
where channels are heavily loaded, and deference among
vehicles can lead to better channel utilization in favor of the
infotainment and safety traffic. The cost of implementing this
strategy is similar to the cost of the SFU strategy discussed in
Case 3 of the EHS use case.
V. FORMAL PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) originated as an application of game theory in the context of biological sciences [44],
based on the understanding that frequency dependent fitness introduces a strategic aspect to evolution. Within EGT,
population games consider the behavior of populations of
strategically interacting players. There are two types of population games, ‘‘pairwise’’ games and ‘‘games against the
field.’’
In pairwise games, each player is assumed to play against
a random player in the population and the overall utility
is determined based on statistical analysis of the utility of
players in the population. The individual utility obtained by
the user is calculated based on the game structure.
Smith in [45] describes advantages of ‘‘games against the
field’’ over pairwise games. In the former game, the player
plays against the whole population or against a subsection
of it. Unlike pairwise games, the field approach does not
require complete knowledge about the structure of the game.
Rather, it relies on the accumulation of empirical information
about the relative advantages of individual pure strategies.
This idea was first put forth by Nash in [46], and has since
been described in many textbooks (e.g., see [47]).
In general game theory, Nash equilibrium is an optimal outcome of the game such that no player gains more
utility by unilaterally deviating or changingİ his strategy,
under the assumption that other player(s) strategies remain
unchanged. When the game is in Nash equilibrium, all players reach their maximum utilities and have no incentive to
deviate from their strategies. The ESS is thus a strategy that,
once employed by the whole population, renders impossible
for any other strategy to spontaneously arise. If the whole
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population employs the ESS then the population is, by definition, at Nash equilibrium.
EGT analysis of the proposed system is motivated by the
fact that each user in the system is competing simultaneously
over the channels against all other users. The assumptions of
pair-wise games are not realistic, since these games assume
that the player plays against an individual opponent. By making the assumption that only a small number of users evolve
to employ a better strategy over time, we can thus analyze our
system using the framework of evolutionary game theory.
We follow the standard formal definitions of the ESS [48].
A strategy σ ∗ is an ESS, if mutants that adopt any other
strategy σ leave fewer offsprings in the post-entry population
x := (1−)σ ∗ +σ , assuming that the proportion of mutants
 is sufficiently small (0 <  < ). For σ ∗ to be ESS then:
U (σ ∗ , x ) > U (σ, x )

(26)

where U (σ ∗ , x ) is the payoff (utility) of players that play σ ∗
and U (σ, x ) is the payoff of the mutants that play σ in the
post-entry population, respectively.
In what follows, we define U (S ∗ ; s, x ) as the utility
received by users employing strategy s in a system S ∗ of a
mixed population that utilizes multiple strategies. For convenience, U (S ∗ ; s, x ) is denoted as Us (S ∗ ). The stability of the
strategy, when it exists, is guaranteed only when the number
of users deviating from strategy s is sufficiently small.
A. EXISTENCE OF ESS—THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK

In this section, we describe the conditions in which a homogeneous system of SUs is an ESS—that is, invasion by any
competing mixed strategy will fail, provided the invading
population is sufficiently small. We will first state a general
formulation of conditions for an ESS in the lemma below.
This lemma will be specialized and applied to homogeneous
systems of ACUs, FCUs, and SFUs in the next section. The
next definition is helpful in the results that follow.
Definition 1: Let S ∗ be the system in (15), and σ ∗ =
∗
(p , q∗ , k ∗ ) and σ = (p, q, k) are mixed strategies where
ACU, FCU, SFU are used with probabilities p∗ , q∗ , k ∗ , for
σ ∗ and p, q, k, for σ , respectively; where (p∗ + q∗ + k ∗ = 1)
and (p + q + k = 1). Define
A(S ∗ , σ ∗ , σ ) = p∗ (p∗ − p) · UACU (S ∗ )
+ q∗ (q∗ − q) · UFCU (S ∗ )
+ k ∗ (k ∗ − k) · USFU (S ∗ )

(27)

B(S , σ , σ ) = (p − p) · UACU (S )
∗

∗

∗

2

∗

+ (q∗ − q)2 · UFCU (S ∗ )
+ (k ∗ − k)2 · USFU (S ∗ )

(28)

Lemma 1: Let S ∗ be the system in (15), and suppose that
the majority 1 −  of SUs employ σ ∗ = (p∗ , q∗ , k ∗ ) where the
ACU, FCU, SFU strategies are used with probabilities p∗ , q∗ ,
k ∗ , respectively. When a small  fraction of SUs contemplate
a defection to a mixed strategy σ = (p, q, k) where ACU,
FCU, and SFU strategies are used with probabilities p, q, k,
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respectively, then for  sufficiently small, the defection fails to
be rational. In particular, S ∗ is evolutionarily stable as long
as
A(S ∗ , σ )
<
(29)
B(S ∗ , σ )
Proof: Since  ≈ 0 the payoff for a defecting player is:
Uσ (S ∗ ) = p · UACU (S ∗ ) + q · UFCU (S ∗ ) + k · USFU (S ∗ )
(30)
The existence of an ESS in an EGT game requires the
inequality condition of Equation (26) to hold. Suppose σ ∗ =
(p∗ , q∗ , k ∗ ) is the strategy employed in S ∗ and σ = (p, q, k)
is the strategy of the defectors. The utility achieved by the
defectors is


Uσ = p p∗ − (p∗ − p) · UACU (S ∗ )


+ q q∗ − (q∗ − q) · UFCU (S ∗ )
 ∗

+ k k − (k ∗ − k) · USFU (S ∗ )
(31)
while the non-defectors achieve


Uσ ∗ = p∗ p∗ − (p∗ − p) · UACU (S ∗ )


+ q∗ q∗ − (q∗ − q) · UFCU (S ∗ )


+ k ∗ k ∗ − (k ∗ − k) · USFU (S ∗ )

(32)

B. EXISTENCE OF ESS

Since we have three pure strategies and one mixed strategy,
we need the following five propositions to study the existence
of ESS:
Proposition 1: If S ∗ is a homogeneous system of ACUs,
a defection to strategy σ = (p, q, k) by an  fraction of
players fails to be rational if  is less than
(1 − p) · UACU (S ∗ )
(1 − p)2 · UACU (S ∗ ) + q2 · UFCU (S ∗ ) + k 2 · USFU (S ∗ )
Proof: Using Lemma 1, we specialize Definition 1 to
the situation σ ∗ = (1, 0, 0) to obtain
(33)

B(S ∗ , σ ) = (1 − p)2 · UACU (S ∗ )
+ q2 · UFCU (S ∗ ) + k 2 · USFU (S ∗ )

(34)

The proposition is proved.

As UACU (S ∗ ) decreases, we see that the bound on  in
Proposition 1 approaches 0, making it more likely that users
will defect away from the homogeneous ACU society. Conversely, as UACU (S ∗ ) increases relative to UFCU (S ∗ ) and
USFU (S ∗ ), we see that the bound on  approaches 1, making it
so users will be unable to defect away from the homogeneous
ACU society without group coordination.
Proposition 2: If S ∗ is a homogeneous system of FCUs,
a defection to strategy σ = (p, q, k) by an  fraction of
players fails to be rational if  is less than
(1 − q) · UFCU (S ∗ )
p2 · UACU (S ∗ ) + (1 − q)2 · UFCU (S ∗ ) + k 2 · USFU (S ∗ )
VOLUME 6, 2018

A(S ∗ , σ ) = (1 − q) · UFCU (S ∗ )

(35)

B(S , σ ) = p · UACU (S )
∗

2

∗

+ (1 − q)2 · UFCU (S ∗ ) + k 2 · USFU (S ∗ )

(36)

The proposition is proved.

As UFCU (S ∗ ) decreases, we see that the bound on  in
Proposition 2 approaches 0, making it more likely that users
will defect away from the homogeneous FCU society. Conversely, as UFCU (S ∗ ) increases relative to UACU (S ∗ ) and
USFU (S ∗ ), we see that the bound on  approaches 1, making it
so users will be unable to defect away from the homogeneous
FCU society without group coordination.
Proposition 3: If S ∗ is a homogeneous system of SFUs,
a defection to strategy σ = (p, q, k) by an  fraction of
players fails to be rational if  is less than
(1 − k) · USFU (S ∗ )
p2 · UACU (S ∗ ) + q2 · UFCU (S ∗ ) + (1 − k)2 · USFU (S ∗ )
Proof: Using Lemma 1, we specialize Definition 1 to
the situation σ ∗ = (0, 0, 1) to obtain

It is easy to check that Uσ ∗ > Uσ if and only if  < A/B. 

A(S ∗ , σ ) = (1 − p) · UACU (S ∗ )

Proof: Using Lemma 1, we specialize Definition 1 to
the situation σ ∗ = (0, 1, 0) to obtain

A(S ∗ , σ ) = (1 − k) · USFU (S ∗ )

(37)

B(S , σ ) = p · UACU (S )
∗

2

∗

+ q2 · UFCU (S ∗ ) + (1 − k)2 · USFU (S ∗ )

(38)

The proposition is proved.

As USFU (S ∗ ) decreases, we see that the bound on  in
Proposition 2 approaches 0, making it more likely that users
will defect away from the homogeneous SFU society. Conversely, as USFU (S ∗ ) increases relative to UACU (S ∗ ) and
UFCU (S ∗ ), we see that the bound on  approaches 1, making it
so users will be unable to defect away from the homogeneous
SFU society without group coordination.
Proposition 4: If S ∗ is a system in which
UACU (S ∗ ) = UFCU (S ∗ ) = USFU (S ∗ )
then no evolutionary stable strategy exists in S ∗ .
Proof: If all utilities of all strategies are equal then
players may switch and mix strategies without penalty,
and because the strict inequality in (26) cannot be made
to hold for any strategy, no strategy is evolutionarily
stable.

Proposition 5: If S ∗ is a system in which UACU (S ∗ ),
UFCU (S ∗ ) and USFU (S ∗ ) are pairwise distinct, and σ
is evolutionary stable strategy in S ∗ , then σ is a pure
strategy.
Proof: Suppose σ is the ESS. The payoff for this strategy is
Uσ (S ∗ ) = p · UACU (S ∗ ) + q · UFCU (S ∗ ) + k · USFU (S ∗ )
This function is convex combination, and so is maximized by
placing all the probability mass on the unique strategy which
has the highest utility. Thus, precisely one of the values p, q, k
is equal to 1.
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Corollary 1: If S ∗ is a system in which UACU (S ∗ ),
UFCU (S ∗ ) and USFU (S ∗ ) are pairwise distinct, and σ is
evolutionary stable strategy in S ∗ , then

∗
∗
∗

ACU if UACU (S ) > UFCU (S ), USFU (S )
σ = FCU if UFCU (S ∗ ) > UACU (S ∗ ), USFU (S ∗ ) (39)


SFU if USFU (S ∗ ) > UACU (S ∗ ), UFCU (S ∗ )
C. FINDING AN ESS

Theorem 1: For a system S ∗ where Xγi (S ∗ ) ≈ 1, ACU is a
winning strategy iff: Pc < min(1, G1s ).
Proof: Corollary 1 mandates that UACU (S ∗ ) >
UFCU (S ∗ ) and UACU (S ∗ ) > USFU (S ∗ ), which implies:
1
M
1
M

M
X
i=1
M
X

Xγi (S ∗ ) > Pc
Xγi (S ∗ ) > Pc

M
X
i=1
M
X

i=1

Ci · Xγi (S ∗ )

and
Gs < 1

(40)
Pc

Ci · Gs · Xγi (S ∗ )

PM

i=1 Ci

Pc

(42)

Pc · Gs < 1

(43)

∀i, j : 1 . . . M ,



Ci = Cj

ACU is a winning strategy iff: Pc < min(1, G1s ).
Proof: Since Ci = Cj for all i, j it follows that
Ci = Cj = 1/M
Substituting into inequalities (40) and (41), we get
Pc < 1

(44)

Pc · Gs < 1

(45)

The theorem is proved.

M
X

Ci · Xγi (S ∗ ) >

M
1 X i ∗
Xγ (S )
M



1) REFLECTIONS ON THEOREMS (1) AND (2)

The antecedent in Theorem (1) means that all channels are
able to accommodate the demand, and thus, from the nodes’
perspective, their demand is fulfilled regardless of their channel choices. The ACUs benefit directly from this condition
as they randomly access the channels. The SFUs and FCUs
detect this condition using their foraging capability, but to
gain this knowledge, they sacrifice some of their channel
access time by foraging some fraction (Pf = 1 − Pc ) of the
time. This behavior hinders their ability to gain utility relative
to the ACUs. On the other hand, SFUs can recapture some of
this loss by the advantage derived from social behavior (Gs ).
As long as the effects of foraging and social gain are less
than 1; however, the SFUs cannot outperform the ACUs
under this condition. The antecedent in Theorem (2), states
that the utilities of all channels are equal but not necessarily
equals 1. This happens when the different channels provide

>

(48)

i=1

Ci · Xγi (S ∗ ) > Pc

M
X

i=1

Pc < 1
The theorem is proved.
Theorem 2: For a system S ∗ , where

M
X
i=1

(41)

= 1, we get

(47)

Proof: Corollary 1 mandates that UFCU (S ∗ )
UACU (S ∗ ) and UFCU (S ∗ ) > USFU (S ∗ ), which implies:

i=1

Substituting Xγi (S ∗ ) = 1 and
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similar throughput; this uniformity implies that the utility lost
due to time spent foraging was in vain since it yielded no
information about the channel environment; leading to the
same conclusion as that of Theorem (1).
Theorem 3: For a system S ∗ , FCU is a winning strategy
iff:
PM i ∗
1
i=1 Xγ (S )
(46)
Pc >
PM
M i=1 Ci · Xγi (S ∗ )

Ci · Gs · Xγi (S ∗ )

(49)

i=1

Rearranging the terms of the two inequalities, the theorem is
proved.

2) REFLECTIONS ON THEOREM 3

The antecedent in Theorem (3) asserts a lower-bound on the
probability of consuming, that is the ratio of the ACU and
FCU utilities, and indicate that the social gain is smaller
than 1. We know already from Theorems (1) and (2), that the
ACUs outperform all strategies when channels have uniform
conditions. In non-uniform settings, the FCUs and SFUs
have the tendency to access channels with better throughput,
based on the values of Ci . In non-uniform channel settings,
the weighted average in the denominator is greater than the
unweighted average in the numerator, and so the ratio of the
ACU to the FCU utilities decreases below 1; the lower bound
on Pc then drops correspondingly, and (for appropriately
chosen Pc < 1) foraging wins. The second antecedent lowerbounds the sociality gain (Gs ) to be less than 1. This condition
restricts the SFUs from compensating for their social coordination overhead and ensures that FCUs outperform SFUs.
Theorem 4: For a system S ∗ , SFU is a winning strategy iff:
PM i ∗
1
i=1 Xγ (S )
Pc >
(50)
PM
M i=1 Ci · Gs · Xγi (S ∗ )
and
Gs > 1

(51)

Proof: Corollary 1 mandates that UFCU (S ∗ )
UACU (S ∗ ) and UFCU (S ∗ ) > USFU (S ∗ ), which implies:
Pc
Pc

M
X
i=1
M
X
i=1

Ci · Gs · Xγi (S ∗ ) >

M
1 X i ∗
Xγ (S )
M

Ci · Gs · Xγi (S ∗ ) > Pc

i=1
M
X

>

(52)

Ci · Xγi (S ∗ )

(53)

i=1
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Rearranging terms of the two inequalities, the theorem is
proved.


The number of users in the community is constant, and hence:
xACU + xFCU + xSFU = 1

(64)

NACU
NFCU
NSFU
+
+
=1
N
N
N

(65)

3) REFLECTIONS ON THEOREM 4

The antecedent in Theorem (4) asserts a lower-bound the
probability of consume, that is the ratio of the ACU and the
SFU utilities, and prescribe a sociality gain greater than 1.
We know already from Theorems (1) and (2), that the ACUs
outperform all strategies when channels have uniform conditions. In non-uniform settings, the FCUs and the SFUs
have the tendency to access channels with better throughput,
based on the values of Ci . In non-uniform channel settings,
the weighted average in the denominator is greater than the
unweighted average in the numerator, and so the ratio of
the ACU to the SFU utilities decreases below 1; the lower
bound on Pc then drops correspondingly, and (for appropriately chosen Pc < 1) foraging wins. The second antecedent
lower-bounds the sociality gain (Gs ) to be greater than 1.
This condition allows the SFUs to benefit from their social
coordination and ensures that SFUs outperform FCUs.
D. REPLICATOR DYNAMICS AND RATE OF CONVERGENCE

The Nash equilibrium doesn’t describe the evolution process
of the population to reach equilibrium, especially in games
with multiple equilibria [49]. On the other hand, the replicator
dynamics details the evolution mechanisms through which
the population arrives at an ESS. Following the general equation for replicator dynamics, we define xi as the portion of
the population playing strategy i and fi (x) as the fitness of
strategy i:
ẋ = xi [fi (x) −

n
X

xj · fi (x)]

(54)

j

where ẋ represents the rate of change of x per unit time.
In order to study the rate of convergence to an ESS, we define
c1 , c2 and c3 as follows:
c1 = [UACU · (1 − xACU )
− UFCU · xFCU − USFU · xSFU ]
c2 = [UFCU · (1 − xFCU )

(55)

− UACU · xACU − USFU · xSFU ]
c3 = [USFU · (1 − xSFU )

(56)

− UACU · xACU − UFCU · xFCU ]

(57)

The replicator dynamics of the ACU, FCU, and SFU strategies is represented as:
ẋACU = c1 · xACU
ẋFCU = c2 · xFCU
ẋSFU = c3 · xSFU

(58)
(59)
(60)

Solving for xACU , xFCU and xSFU yields:
xACU = xACU (0)ec1 t
xFCU = xFCU (0)ec2 t
xSFU = xSFU (0)ec3 t
VOLUME 6, 2018

(61)
(62)
(63)

implying that:

at any point of time.
This implies that users leaving one strategy will be captured by another strategy in the system. The rate of convergence differs based on the values of c1 , c2 and c3 . That means
the time needed for every strategy to evolve in the system
depends on the deviation of population from this strategy.
This evolution converges exponentially; therefore, making
the system stable to temporal changes.
E. DISCUSSIONS

We can conclude the following based on the analytical results
presented in this work:
Similar vs. dissimilar channels’ capacities: For channels
with dissimilar capacities, the FCU and SFU strategies perform better than the ACU strategy, under proper forage and
social tendencies. This is due the fact that the ACU strategy
suffers from degraded throughput over crowded channels,
while the FCU and SFU strategies balance their losses among
channels based on their relative capacities. For channels with
similar capacities, the ACU strategy outperforms as it does
not have the overhead associated with foraging and social
coordination as that of the FCU and SFU strategies.
Mixed strategies vs. pure strategies: The utility of a mixed
strategy is the weighted sum of the utilities of the three
constituent strategies. A given SU can play a mixed strategy
to maximize its benefit. Since the sum of probabilities for
the three strategies equals 1, the maximum utility is obtained
when a player maximizes the weight that corresponds to the
maximum utility. By maximizing this probability, the mixed
strategy changes to be closer to the pure strategy that has the
maximum utility. Furthermore, no combination maximizes
the utility if one of the strategies is better than others as
described in Proposition 5. If the utilities of all strategies
are equal, there is no ESS in the system since the user can
arbitrary choose different strategies that achieve the same
utility.
Replicator dynamics: The rate of convergence of the population towards the ESS strategy is important to quantify the
time needed for the population to reach an ESS. This rate
depends on the relative fitness of the strategies.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

In this section, a testbed is presented to experiment with
channel switching and strategy evolution in Wireless Local
Area Networks (WLANs). The testbed design and implementation are described next, followed by experimental results
and discussions.
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Each experiment is split into two phases: (1) channel
switching and (2) strategy evolution (see Figure 4). Each
phase, in turn, is divided into iterations, and the duration
of each iteration is 60 seconds. Within a channel switching
phase, each SU operates by switching channels, transmitting
data, and following its strategy. At the end of each iteration,
the total throughput within each physical channel is tabulated;
this data is used as a proxy measurement for the CSI, and is
then used to inform strategy selection for the next iteration.

FIGURE 3. Experimental testbed.

TABLE 1. Experimental parameters.

FIGURE 4. Channel switching and strategy evolution of SUs.

A. EXPERIMENTAL TESTBED

For experimental purposes, a testbed was developed; its architecture is shown in Figure 3. Five Small-Form Factor SingeBoard Computers (SBCs) are setup with Ubuntu Linux. The
SBCs are UDOO devices with ARM i.MX6 NXP R processor. Each SBC is equipped with a Netgear-N150 Wireless-N
USB adapter, enabled with Atheros device driver. ns-3 is
installed on two SBCs to transmit and receive SUs traffic. The
ns-3 network in these two SBCs runs as a WLAN 802.11g
network: network nodes (SUs) are uniformly distributed
around an Access Point (AP) on a circle with 10m radius,
eliminating the impact of distance on the SUs’ throughput variability. A standard log-distance channel propagation
model is used [51]. System parameters are listed in Table 1.
At the same time, a second pair of SBCs are dedicated for
emulating the behavior of primary users. To experiment with
channels that have different capacities, PU traffic is generated on the channel using the iperf tool in Linux and the
back-off algorithm is turned off on the WiFi devices so that
PUs have priority over the SUs to access the channels. This
behavior is realized by changing the register values in the
ModWiFi [52] device driver and verified experimentally (see
Table 2). Finally, a 5th SBC represents the node manager
that controls the experiments and monitors the traffic over the
physical channel using wireshark.
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In this work, the channel estimation is sent to the SUs in
centralized fashion. The node manager collects the channels
estimations and send it to the SUs. In general, the SUs can
implement both types of sensing, namely: channel sensing:
to obtain channel capacity and social sensing: to obtain the
identities of co-users, in a distributed or centralized fashion.
Only SFUs exchange and coordinate information (as part of
their social functions) to implement the deference behavior.
ACUs and FCUs act independently and FCUs obtain their
own channels estimates, without exchanging information
with other SUs.
In our experiments, we consider a range of CR scenarios. Throughout, we assume a network of 80 SUs sharing
4 channels (each with 11 Mbps channel capacity) in ns-3
real-time mode. We always start with 20 SUs on each ns-3
channel, with 80% of the SUs being of one type, and 10% of
each of the other two types. After each iteration is completed
the node manager reports CSI to all SUs so they can update
their channel selection probabilities as well as for strategy
evolution decisions.
In some experiments, residual channel capacities are taken
to be homogeneous: all channels having the PUs transmitting at 1 Mbps. In other experiments, channels are assumed
heterogeneous: two channels have the PUs transmitting at
19 Mbps and two having the PUs transmitting at 0.25 Mbps.
We take the SUs’ load to be either light: each SU transmits at
a rate of R = 10 Kbps, moderate R = 40 Kbps, or heavy
VOLUME 6, 2018
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R = 65 Kbps. The total offered traffic thus ranges from
200 Kbps to 1300 Kbps.

a strategy which outperformed their current strategy
in the previous phase. Consequently, SUs use their
communal experiences within phases to learn about the
strategy that is better suited to the given DSA scenario.
If no system utility enhancement is achieved and the SUs
strategies stable for 5 iterations, the system is considered as
converged and the experiment is terminated.
A result of one iteration is shown in Table 2. These results
are associated with the results in Table 3-Figure (g). It can be
clearly seen that the PUs obtained the required throughput,
while the SUs (ACUs, FCUs, and SFUs) obtained throughput
based on the remaining capacity during the PU transmissions.
TABLE 2. Results of a single iteration.

FIGURE 5. Timeline of actions during each experiment.

Figure 5 illustrates the steps followed in each iteration.
These steps are detailed in the following paragraphs:
1) The experiment starts by preparing the configuration
for nodes in the setup phase (see Figure 5). The node
manager sends commands to the PU-Rx node to be
ready for receiving data from the PU-Tx node.
2) The node manager sends commands to the PU-Tx node
to start transmission using the iperf tool with a predefined transmission rate. The PU data transmission is
initiated first to ensure that the channel is loaded with
PU traffic prior to SU transmissions on the channel.
3) The node manager sends commands to the SU-Rx and
SU-Tx nodes to start receiving and transmitting data,
respectively.
4) For SU traffic, UDP packets from the SU-Tx node are
passed from the ns-3 network through the tap-bridge
device to the WiFi device on the UDOO SBC.
5) Packets are then transmitted over the air on the physical
WLAN channel, under the presence of the PU traffic.
6) In the corresponding SU-Rx node, packets that received
by WiFi devices are passed to the ns-3 SU-Rx node
through the tap-bridge.
7) Throughput counters are used to calculate the throughput for data flows.
8) Throughput values for different SUs are sent to the
node manager in order to make channel switching and
strategy evolution decisions.
9) The node manager waits for the results and checks the
connectivity among the PU and SU devices and saves
the results used for the next experiment.
10) The node manager receives CSI details (i.e., throughput) from the SU-Rx node.
11) Prior to starting the next iteration, a small number of
randomly selected SUs are permitted to use the aggregated data as the basis for changing strategies; in our
experiments, this small set of ‘‘evolving’’ SUs choose
VOLUME 6, 2018

B. RESULTS

We describe 3 × 3 = 9 different scenarios covering all the
possibilities in which one of the 3 strategies (ACU, FCU,
SFU) is dominant at the beginning, and another is eventually
dominant post-evolution. These experiments are illustrated
in Table 3. Each column represents the initially dominant
strategy in each of the scenarios, while the row represents
the final dominant strategy. Each cell of the table is labeled
by its environmental parameters (above) and an informal
description (below). The 9 experiments show that (A) the
specific winning strategy that emerges as the eventual winner
in the evolutionary process is determined by the environmental parameters; (B) more sophisticated strategies are not
always preferred; (C) in each case, the population evolves
to a homogeneous configuration in which all SUs employ
the same strategy. Most significantly, (D) strategy evolution
yields a significant improvement in the aggregate throughput
of the overall system, as illustrated in the Figure 6. Running
the experiment with different values for media access eagerness (reflected in Pc ), social preferences (captured by Ps ), and
channel characteristics (i.e. PU traffic assumptions) results in
different evolution patterns. While PU traffic affects all three
strategies, Pc only mediates the performance of FCU and SFU
strategies.
To assess the efficacy of the ACU strategy, we conducted
3 experiments using the experimental channel and strategy
parameters detailed in Table 1 and in the headers above
each of the figures in Table 3-Figure (a)-(c). In these scenarios, all channels were lightly loaded with PUs (0.25Mbps).
In these experiments, the ACUs are uniformly distributed
over the channels. The FCU and SFU strive to maximize
their utility by accessing better channels more often. Hence,
all strategies end up distributing their users equally over the
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TABLE 3. Experimental evaluation of the ACU, FCU, and SFU strategies. (a) ACU initially dominant, ACU eventual winner. (b) FCU initially dominant,
ACU eventual winner. (c) SFU initially dominant, ACU eventual winner. (d) ACU initially dominant, FCU eventual winner. (e) FCU initially dominant,
FCU eventual winner. (f) SFU initially dominant, FCU eventual winner. (g) ACU initially dominant, SFU eventual winner. (h) FCU initially
dominant, SFU eventual winner. (i) SFU initially dominant, SFU eventual winner.

channels. Since the FCUs and SFUs have less probability to
transmit over the channel due to their probability of foraging
1 − Pc = 0.1, the utilities of the FCUs and SFUs decrease
and the ACU strategy dominates the community. In our
experiments, the ACU baseline strategy showed (2.6−21.3%)
improvement over other strategies as shown in
Figure 6-Columns (a)-(c). The SFU strategy utility decreased
in the community since the probability of deference is
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high (i.e., Ps = 0.9). The ACU strategy still had the potential
to be the winning strategy since ACUs transmit on all channels while the FCU and SFU transmissions are decreased due
to their foraging behavior.
To assess the efficacy of the FCU strategy, we conducted 3 experiments using the experimental channel and
strategy parameters detailed in Table 1 and in the headers
above each of the figures in Table 3-Figure (d)-(f). In these
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FIGURE 6. Experimental throughput improvement.

scenarios, two channels were highly loaded with PUs
(19Mbps), and two channels were lightly loaded (250kbps).
In these scenarios, the ACU strategy does not adapt to the
channel conditions since ACUs are distributed quasi equally
over channels. In contrast, the FCUs and SFUs are distributed
with more probability on channels 3 and 4 since they have
more benefit in terms of throughput due to better channel
conditions. Notice that even though the FCU and the SFU
strategies lose 1 − Pc amount of their utility on the channels, they compensate that by switching to better channels.
Furthermore, the FCU strategy has more potential in the
community since the SFU strategy suffers from S− which
decreases its utility especially in scenarios in which S+ is
low. The three scenarios also present the FCU strategy with
different initial number of users where it needs to be the
ESS in the community. In our experiments, the FCU strategy
showed (20.3 − 42.2%) improvement over other strategies as
shown in Figure 6-Columns (d)-(f).
To assess the efficacy of the SFU strategy, we conducted
3 experiments using the experimental channel and strategy
parameters detailed in Table 1 and in the headers above each
of the figures in Table 3-Figure (g)-(i). In these scenarios, two
channels were highly loaded with PUs (19Mbps), and two
channels were lightly loaded (250kbps). The SFUs had less
overhead due to cooperation (i.e., S− decreased), and receive
more enhancement (i.e., R increased by S+ ). The FCU and
SFU strategies had more potential over the ACU strategy due
to channel switching, and the SFU strategy had more benefits
due to the social behavior, by allowing Ps percent of SFUs
users (50%) to transmit over better channels with the elevated
rate. The SFU strategy then dominates the community and
evolve to be the ESS. In our experiments, the SFU strategy
showed (39.1 − 78.3%) improvement over other strategies as
shown in Figure 6-Columns (g)-(i).
C. DISCUSSIONS

The experimental results are discussed further below.
The ACU strategy outperforms the other strategies in scenarios that involve lightly loaded channels with similar capacities. In such scenarios, the ACU strategy outperforms since
the foraging and sociality incur unnecessary overhead that
VOLUME 6, 2018

negatively impacts the SUs’ utilities and the overall system
utility.
The FCU strategy outperforms the other strategies in
scenarios that involve moderately loaded channels with dissimilar capacities. In such scenarios, employing the foraging behavior is advantageous (relative to the ACU strategy)
because it allows the SUs to find and use better channels.
Social behavior is not advantageous since the deference
behavior does not yield significant advantage to reduce the
contention on the channels since the channels are not heavily
loaded.
The SFU strategy outperforms other strategies in scenarios
that involve heavily loaded channels with dissimilar capacities. By employing the social deference behavior, only 1 − PS
fraction of the SFUs transmit at a higher rate, while the
remaining defer—this yields higher system utility. This is due
to the reduction in contention over channels.
Long-term versus Short-term: The ACU strategy represents
a short-term behavior, in which SUs tend to access channels
immediately. The FCU and SFU strategies show more longterm behavior, in which they sacrifice part of their time to
sense the channels and then access better resources in later
time.
Altruism versus Selfishness: The SFU strategy shows an
altruistic behavior, in which SUs are deferring to each other
based on their social relationships. In contrast, the ACU and
FCU strategies show self-centered selfish behaviors, in which
they access channels ignoring the identity of other SUs on the
channels.
VII. CONCLUSION

In this work, we devised three different strategies in order to
address the social aspects of DSA etiquette. We proved analytically that each strategy has a potential to win or lose in a
system of SUs, based on the condition of the channels utilized
and social attributes of the users. Given channel conditions
and users’ behaviors, SUs evolve to one and only one strategy
that is considered evolutionary stable. We showed analytically that no mixed strategies yield a stable strategy for the
system. Furthermore, we showed that, under some conditions,
SUs with more social tendency gain more benefits on the long
run when compared with selfish SUs, who prefer myopic,
short-term benefits. The proposed analytical framework, can
be extended to study new strategies that exhibit a distinct
social and cognitive behaviors, depending on observed community of SUs and network metrics. Future work includes,
but not limited to, applying the proposed strategies in different use cases such as EHS, IoT, and VANETs.
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